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Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property Law – The 
Need for Horizontal Fair Use Defences
During the last decades, IP protection has been expanded continuously.1 New technologies 
were found eligible for patent protection.2 New types of marks have been recognized in 
trademark law.3 Copyright law is no longer confined to the cultural domain.4 In parallel, the 
exclusive rights of IP owners have been broadened. The TRIPS Agreement provides for a 
comprehensive portfolio of patent minimum rights.5 The WIPO Copyright Treaty added new 
layers of protection to the standard reached under the Berne Convention.6 As a result of 
protection against dilution, trademark rights have become instruments for the exploitation of 
brand image.7
Enhanced protection, however, gives rise to the question of appropriate counterbalances. 
Flexible rights are likely to require flexible limitations for at least two reasons. On the one 
hand, flexible limitations facilitate the task of maintaining a proper balance between 
protection and competing freedoms within individual protection regimes. On the other hand, 
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1 For an early critical assessment of this broader trend, see J.H. Spoor, De gestage groei van merk, werk en 
uitvinding, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 1990.
2 This tendency has been particularly strong in US patent law. For instance, see US Supreme Court, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980), Diamond vs. Chakrabarty, with regard to biotechnology. Cf. G.J. Maier/R.C. Mattson, State Street Bank 
ist kein Ausreißer: Die Geschichte der Softwarepatentierung im US-amerikanischen Recht, GRUR International 
2001, p. 677; R.P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business 
Concepts and Patent System Reform, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 14 (1999), p. 577 (587). As to current,
more cautious approaches in US patent law, see US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 545 F.3d 943, 88 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008), In re Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw. 
3 Cf. J. Gilson/A. Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: 
Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, Trade Mark Reporter 95 (2005), p. 773; K.-H. Fezer, Eine Theorie der 
variablen Marke – Zum Markenschutz für Markenbildungskonzeptionen, GRUR 2005, p. 102.
4 With the inclusion of computer programs, technical machine instructions have become part of the subject 
matter eligible for copyright protection. See Article 10(1) TRIPS and Article 4 WCT. As to the impact of this 
inclusion on the copyright system, see S.E. Gordon, The Very Idea! Why Copyright is an Inappropriate Way to 
Protect Computer Programs, EIPR 1998, p. 10; A.A. Quaedvlieg, Auteursrecht op techniek, Zwolle: Tjeenk 
Willink 1987; A. Dietz, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Trojan Horse or Stimulus for the Future 
Copyright System?, UFITA 110 (1985), p. 57. 
5 See Article 28 TRIPS. Cf. D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2nd ed., London 
2003; C. M. Correa, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007.
6 See Articles 11 and 12 WCT on the protection of technological measures and rights management information. 
Cf. M. Girsberger, Schutz von technischen Maßnahmen im Urheberrecht: Die WIPO-Internetabkommen und 
deren Umsetzung in den Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union und der Schweiz, Bern: Stämpfli 2007; C. 
Arlt, Digital Rights Management Systeme – Der Einsatz technischer Maßnahmen zum Schutz digitaler Inhalte, 
München: C.H. Beck 2006; K. Koelman, Auteursrecht en technische voorzieningen, Den Haag: SDU 2003; S. 
Bechtold, Vom Urheber- zum Informationsrecht: Implikationen des Digital Rights Management, München: C.H. 
Beck 2002; P. Wand, Technische Schutzmaßnahmen und Urheberrecht, München: C.H. Beck 2001.
7 Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC Law, 
IIC 40 (2009), p. 45; K.-H. Fezer, Entwicklungslinien und Prinzipien des Markenrechts in Europa – Auf dem 
Weg zur Marke als einem immaterialgüterrechtlichen Kommunikationszeichen, GRUR 2003, p. 457.
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flexible limitations can be employed to safeguard breathing space for unauthorized use when 
it comes to overlaps between different forms of IP protection. If an intellectual creation enjoys 
cumulative protection in different IP protection systems,8 a network of corresponding, flexible 
limitations ensures that the freedom offered in one system is not eroded through protection 
granted in another system.
The flexibility required within and across IP protection regimes may be provided by open-
ended fair use provisions that allow the courts to develop and adjust IP limitations case-by-
case on the basis of abstract criteria. Against this background, the following analysis 
explores the notion of fair use (I) and identifies factors indicating a need for fair use solutions 
(II and III) before embarking on a discussion of the situation in copyright (IV), patent (V) and 
trademark (VI) law. Drawing conclusions, protection overlaps will be considered (VII).
I. Definition
The term ‘fair use’ is often understood as a reference to the fair use doctrine that evolved in 
US copyright law.9 However, it is not the purpose of the present inquiry to clarify whether
this particular type of fair use legislation could serve as a model for the horizontal regulation 
of IP limitations. In the present context, the term ‘fair use’ merely indicates that limitations 
are regulated in a flexible way. Instead of a closed list of precisely-defined exceptions to 
exclusive rights, a fair use system rests on abstract criteria allowing the judge to determine 
whether a given unauthorized use is to be deemed permissible.
While the fair use doctrine in US copyright law complies with this general description of the 
phenomenon,10 it constitutes only one particular example of conceivable fair use approaches. 
The fair use defence may feature less prominently in a system of IP limitations. The 
regulation of limitations may even rely predominantly on precisely-defined exceptions and 
still qualify as a fair use system as long as the list of specific exceptions is supplemented with 
an open-ended clause for the identification of additional types of permissible unauthorized use
in the light of the individual circumstances of a given case. For the purposes of the present 
  
8 Cf. E. Derclaye/M. Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps: A European Perspective, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2010; A. Cruquenaire/S. Dussollier (eds.), Le cumul des droits intellectuels, Brussels: Larcier 2009.
9 Section 107 of the US Copyright Act permits the unauthorized use of copyrighted material for purposes ‘such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching […], scholarship, or research.’ To guide the decision on 
individual forms of use, four factors are set forth in the provision which shall be taken into account among other 
considerations that may be relevant in a given case:
‘(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’ 
10 The list of purposes referred to in Section 107 of the US Copyright Act is understood as an open, non-
exclusive enumeration. See Senate and House Committee Reports, as quoted by L.E. Seltzer, Exemptions and 
Fair Use in Copyright – The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the 1976 Copyright Act, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts)/London: Harvard University Press 1978, p. 19-20: ‘…since the doctrine is an equitable rule of 
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its 
own facts… The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use […] but there is 
no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute… Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use 
is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on 
a case-by-case basis.’
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analysis, the term ‘fair use’, thus, broadly refers to some flexible element in the regulation of 
IP limitations that opens up the system.11
Moreover, fair use need not be equated with use free of charge in the present context. While 
the US fair use doctrine does not provide for the payment of equitable remuneration, the 
inclusion of this feature will not be deemed incompatible with the notion of fair use in the 
following analysis. The payment of compensation enhances the breathing space that can be 
created in fair use systems.12 When the permission of unauthorized use seems desirable even 
though the exemption impacts deeply on the position of the right owner, the payment of 
equitable remuneration constitutes an important balancing instrument broadening the scope of 
potential fair use solutions. Therefore, the following analysis includes the consideration of 
enhanced flexibility that follows from solutions based on compensation payments.13
II. Rationale
In copyright theory, the fair use approach is associated with the utilitarian foundation of the 
Anglo-American copyright tradition perceiving copyright as a prerogative granted to enhance 
the overall welfare of society by ensuring a sufficient supply of knowledge and information.14
This theoretical basis only justifies rights strong enough to induce the desired production of 
intellectual works. Therefore, the exclusive rights of authors deserve individual positive legal 
enactment.15 Those forms of use that need not be reserved for the right owner to provide the 
necessary incentive remain free. Otherwise, rights would be awarded that are unnecessary to 
achieve the goals of the system. In sum, exclusive rights are thus delineated precisely, while 
their limitation can be regulated flexibly in open-ended provisions, such as fair use.16
Oversimplifying the theoretical model underlying common law copyright, it might be said 
that freedom of use is the rule, rights are the exception.
The opposite constellation – rights the rule, freedom the exception – follows from the natural 
law underpinning of continental-European droit d’auteur. In the natural law theory, the author 
occupies centre stage.17 A literary or artistic work is perceived as a materialization of the 
author’s personality. Accordingly, it is assumed that a bond unites the author with the object 
  
11 For a detailed discussion of different types of fair use legislation, see A. Förster, Fair Use, Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck 2008, p. 211-222.
12 This advantage outweighs the disadvantage of costs arising from the necessity to establish collective licensing 
bodies and ensure the appropriate distribution of collected compensation payments among right owners.
13 This approach is in line with international standards. With regard to the three-step test in copyright law, for 
instance, it is recognized that the payment of equitable remuneration may be used to reduce an unreasonable 
prejudice to legitimate interests to a permissible, reasonable level. Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations 
and the Three-Step Test – An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The 
Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 125-133.
14 In this vein, the US Supreme Court, for instance, referred to copyright as an ‘engine of free expression’ in 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 (1985), III B.
15 Cf. A. Strowel, Droit d’auteur and Copyright: Between History and Nature, in: B. Sherman/A. Strowel, Of 
Authors and Origins, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994, p. 235 (241-249); S.P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis 
of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate 
Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, Fordham Intellectual Property Media 
and Entertainment Law Journal 9 (1998), p. 301 (310).
16 See P.E. Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in: B. 
Sherman/A. Strowel, supra note 15, p. 159 (170); Strowel, supra note 15, 250-251.
17 Cf. B. Edelman, The Law’s Eye: Nature and Copyright, in: B. Sherman/A. Strowel, supra note 15, p. 79 (82-
87); Geller, supra note 16, 169-170; Strowel, supra note 15, 236-237.
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of her creation.18 Moreover, the author acquires a property right in her work by virtue of the 
mere act of creation. This has the corollary that nothing is left to the law apart from formally 
recognizing what is already inherent in the ‘very nature of things’.19 The author-centrism of 
the civil law system calls on the legislator to safeguard rights broad enough to concede to 
authors the opportunity to profit from the use of their self-expression, and to bar factors that 
might stymie their exploitation. In consequence, civil law copyright systems recognize 
flexible, broad exclusive rights. Exceptions, by contrast, are defined narrowly and often 
interpreted restrictively.20
While this analysis on the basis of copyright theory may explain the evolution of fair use in 
common law jurisdictions, it fails to provide justifications for fair use. This is particularly true 
with regard to the ostensible antagonism between author centrism and flexible rights in civil 
law jurisdictions, and utilitarianism and flexible limitations in common law jurisdictions.21
The particular advantage of fair use can hardly be derived from reflections on differences in 
legal theory. The merits of fair use come to the fore, however, once the costs of IP protection 
are factored into the equation. Intellectual property rights restrict fundamental freedoms, 
particularly freedom of expression and freedom of competition.22 From an economic 
perspective, it is to be considered that IP monopolies, while spurring investment in new 
creations, also impede follow-on innovation requiring the use of pre-existing, protected 
material. Hence, there is a delicate balance inherent in all IP protection regimes.23
With regard to the maintenance of this balance, fair use has a crucial role to play. In advanced 
IP protection systems offering flexible, broad exclusive rights, it is wise to employ fair use as 
a counterbalance. In this way, the risk of counterproductive overprotection can be minimized. 
An IP regime with only a limited number of narrow exclusive rights, by contrast, does not 
necessarily require an open-ended fair use defence. In the absence of flexible rights, 
overprotection is less likely. Precisely-defined exceptions may be sufficient.
  
18 Cf. E. Ulmer, Urheber- und Verlagsrecht, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer 1980, p. 110-111. See H. 
Desbois, Le droit d’auteur en France, 2nd edn. – mise a jour 1973, Paris: Dalloz 1978, p. 538.
19 See Desbois, supra note 18, 538; Ulmer, supra note 18, 105-106.
20 Cf. F.W. Grosheide, Auteursrecht op Maat, Deventer: Kluwer 1986, p. 2; Geller, supra note 16, 170; Strowel, 
supra note 15, 249-250. For a recent confirmation of this questionable dogma, see Förster, supra note 11, 182-
184. Cf. ECJ, July 16, 2009, case C-5/08, Infopaq International/Danske Dagblades Forening.
21From a historical perspective, this antagonism may not be overestimated anyway. See  J.C. Ginsburg, A Tale of 
Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, in: B. Sherman/A. Strowel, Of 
Authors and Origins, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994, p. 131 (133).
22 See E.J. Dommering, De achtervolging van Prometheus – over vrijheid en bezit van informatie, Amsterdam: 
Otto Cramwinckel 2008; W. McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 18 (2008), 1205-1227; C. Geiger, ‘Constitutionalising’ 
Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 
IIC 37 (2006), p. 371; A. Strowel/F. Tulkens/D. Voorhoof (eds.), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Brussels: 
Editions Larcier 2006; P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe’, in: N. Elkin-
Koren/N.W. Netanel (eds.), The Commodification of Information, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer 2002, p. 
239; Th. Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?, in: 
R. Dreyfuss/D. Leenheer-Zimmerman/H. First (eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, 295-316; S. 
Macciacchini, Urheberrecht und Meinungsfreiheit, Bern: Stämpfli 2000; Y. Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to 
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’, New York University Law 
Review 74 (1999), p. 355; N.W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, Yale Law Journal 106 
(1996), p. 283.
23 Cf. W.N. Landes/R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Harvard: Harvard 
University Press 2003. With regard to copyright law, see from the same authors: W.N. Landes/R.A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, The Journal of Legal Studies 18 (1989), p. 325.
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Accordingly, the fair use discussion does not concern the question whether freedom of use 
should be the rule, and protection the exception. Instead, it concerns the question of 
appropriate balancing tools. Flexible rights necessitate flexible limitations. This becomes 
obvious in times of new technological developments that impact on the IP system. In these 
times of change, broad exclusive rights are likely to absorb and restrict new possibilities of 
use even though this may be undesirable from the perspective of social, cultural or economic 
needs.24 In this situation, abstract fair use factors ensure a fast reaction. They allow the courts
to re-establish a proper balance between freedom and protection. A closed system of 
narrowly-defined limitations, by contrast, is likely to react too slowly to unforeseen 
challenges. It requires the intervention of the legislator and the development of new, specific
exceptions. This process of law making can hardly keep pace with rapid technological 
advances. As a result, the balance between freedom and protection will be lost.
The Internet, for example, keeps posing challenges to copyright law. In this situation, fair use 
legislation renders the protection system capable of coping with the need for constant 
reconsideration and recalibration of the balance between rights and freedoms. US courts can 
rely on the US fair use doctrine, for example, to deal with enhanced search engine services25
and user-created content.26 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded with regard to the 
use of image thumbnails in Google search services that 
‘the significantly transformative nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light 
of its public benefit, outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of the 
thumbnails in this case. In reaching this conclusion, we note the importance of 
analyzing fair use flexibly in light of new circumstances.’27
In the absence of a flexible fair use defence, initiatives in the EC rather focus on amendments 
to copyright legislation. In Germany, the District Court of Hamburg, also dealing with 
Google’s image search service, explicitly recognized that search engines were of 
‘essential importance for structuring the decentralised architecture of the world wide 
web, localising widely scattered contents and knowledge, and therefore, ultimately, for 
the functioning of a networked society.’28
  
24 With regard to the critical assessment of broad IP protection, see K. Assaf, Der Markenschutz und seine 
kulturelle Bedeutung, GRUR Int. 2009, p. 1; G. Mazziotti, EU Digital Copyright Law and the End-User, 
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer 2008; O. Depenheuer/K.N. Peifer (eds.), Geistiges Eigentum: Schutzrecht oder 
Ausbeutungstitel?, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer 2008; R.M. Hilty, Sündenbock Urheberrecht?, in: A. Ohly/D. 
Klippel (eds.), Geistiges Eigentum und Gemeinfreiheit, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007, p. 111; R.M. Hilty/A. 
Peukert, Interessenausgleich im Urheberrecht, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2004; C. Geiger, Droit d’auteur et droit du 
public à l’information, approche de droit comparé, Paris: Litec 2004 ; D. Kröger, Informationsfreiheit und 
Urheberrecht, München: C.H. Beck 2002; Th. Hoeren, Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft, GRUR 
1997, p. 866; R. Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, so Should we be Paying Rent? 
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & Arts 20 (1996), p. 
123.
25 See US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, May 16, 2007, Perfect 10, Inc. vs. Amazon.com, Fd 3d.
26 See United States District Court Southern District of New York, September 8, 2008, Warner Bros. and J.K. 
Rowling vs. RDR Books, 07 Civ. 9667 (RPP). Cf. the case comment by A.J. Sanders, EIPR 2009, p. 45.
27 See US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, supra note 25, para. 12.
28 See Landgericht Hamburg , September 26, 2008, case no. 308 O 248/07, section B.I.6.d., online available at 
http://www.openjur.de/u/30461-308_o_248-07.html.
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However, in spite of this ‘esteem for search engine services’, the Court did not feel in a 
position to interpret the German quotation right extensively to exempt the use of thumbnails 
in the image search system. As the right of quotation had been designed with an eye to use 
under different circumstances, the Court felt that it was the task of the legislator to intervene 
and reconcile the interests of authors and right owners with the strong public interest in access 
to graphical online information and the economic interests of search engine providers.29 In the 
absence of an open-ended fair use provision, the Court was paralyzed by an inflexible 
limitation infrastructure.
III. Hypothesis
The central advantage of fair use, therefore, is enhanced flexibility in the area of IP limitations
to maintain an appropriate balance between freedom of use and protection of right owners. 
This counterbalance is particularly needed in IP protection systems offering flexible, broad
exclusive rights. In particular, it becomes crucial when rapid technological developments 
impact on IP protection regimes and disturb their equilibrium between rights and limitations.
Given the continuous expansion of IP protection during the last decades, and the constant 
impact of new technologies, it can be hypothesized that these conditions for the introduction 
of fair use defences are fulfilled. Against this background, an attempt will be made to show
that fair use defences are required in several branches of protection (IV-VI). On the basis of 
this analysis, it will finally be considered whether a universal fair use infrastructure is needed 
to safeguard the inner consistency of the IP system in case of protection overlaps (VII).  
IV. Copyright
Flexible fair use defences can be found in the copyright legislation of many countries.30 If the
adoption of fair use elements is more than a relict of the Anglo-American copyright tradition, 
it should be possible to show that the identified factors justifying a fair use approach are 
fulfilled in the case of the copyright system (1). Subsequently, it must be asked whether 
national fair use legislation complies with international copyright standards (2). To emphasize 
the current need for fair use, the shortcomings of restrictive EC legislation will finally be 
considered (3) before drawing conclusions (4).
1. Need for Fair Use
With regard to flexible, broad exclusive rights, a trend towards comprehensive entitlements
can be inferred from developments at the international level. It was one of the major 
accomplishments of the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the Berne 
Convention to formally recognize a general right of reproduction in Article 9(1) BC.31 In 
  
29 See Landgericht Hamburg, ibid., section B.I.6.d. Cf. Oberlandesgericht Jena, GRUR-RR 2008, p. 223 (224). 
With regard to the scope of the quotation right under the German Copyright Act, see Th. Dreier, Thumbnails als 
Zitate? – Zur Reichweite von § 51 UrhG in der Informationsgesellschaft, in: U. Blaurock/J. Bornkamm/C. 
Kirchberg (eds.), Festschrift für Achim Krämer zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin: De Gruyter 2009, p. 225.
30 Moreover, new systems are established. With regard to the introduction of fair use in Israel, see O. Fischman 
Afori, An Open Standard ‘Fair Use’ Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli Initiative, EIPR 2008, p. 85.
31 The recognition of a general right aimed at redressing the anomaly that the Convention did not reflect the 
fundamental position held by the right of reproduction, whereas broad reproduction rights had become 
widespread in national legislation. See Doc. S/1, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm 
June 11 to July 14, 1967, Geneva: WIPO 1971, p. 81 and p. 111-112. 
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Article 8 WCT, a general right of communication to the public has later been added to this 
portfolio of flexible, broad rights.32 Further grants of protection, such as public performance, 
translation and adaptation rights, complement these general rights.33
An additional factor to be considered is the openness of the copyright system with regard to 
subject matter eligible for protection. The Berne Convention contents itself with the 
clarification that the notion encompasses ‘every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression’, and provides an 
illustrative list of subject matter ranging from ‘books, pamphlets and other writings’ to ‘works 
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science’.34 Article 10(1) TRIPS and Article 
4 WCT add computer programs. In most national jurisdictions, elastic tests of ‘originality’ are 
applied to identify the subject matter of copyright protection. In consequence, the doors to 
copyright protection are wide open.
Therefore, it is justified to speak of a flexible, broad grant of protection in copyright law –
both in terms of exclusive rights and subject matter of protection. In addition, copyright law is 
constantly challenged by new technological developments. The fast development of online 
technology and corresponding business models requires continuous recalibrations of the 
protection system. File-sharing platforms, search engine services, user-created content and the 
digitization of cultural material can serve as examples of current phenomena requiring the 
reconsideration of the scope of protection.35 Hence, both factors identified above – flexible, 
broad protection and new technological developments – weigh in favour of fair use in the case 
of copyright law. 
2. Permissibility
International copyright law reflects the need for flexible solutions in the field of limitations. 
Article 9(2) BC offers national law makers the freedom 
‘…to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that 
such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.’
This three-step test – certain special cases (step 1), no conflict with a normal exploitation
(step 2), no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests (step 3) – also made its way into 
  
32 This general right is without prejudice to the specific rights recognized earlier in the Berne Convention. See 
Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) BC.
33 See Articles 11(1)(i), 11ter(1)(i), 11bis(1)(iii), Article 8 and Articles 12, 14 BC.
34 See Article 2(1) BC.
35 Cf. N. Helberger/L. Guibault/E.H. Janssen/N.A.N.M. Van Eijk/C. Angelopoulos/J.V.J. Van Hoboken, Legal 
Aspects of User Created Content (2009), online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499333; P.B. Hugenholtz, 
De Google Book-schikking: de wereldliteratuur gelicentieerd, Nederlands Juristenblad 2009, p. 2145; J. 
Edström/H. Nilsson, The Pirate Bay Verdict – Predictable, and Yet, EIPR 2009, p. 483; M. Elferink/A. 
Ringnalda, Digitale ontsluiting van historische archieven en verweesde werken, Amstelveen: deLex 2009; K. 
Welp, Die Auskunftspflicht von Access-Providern nach dem Urheberrechtsgesetz, München: C.H. Beck 2009; 
J.V.J. Van Hoboken, De aansprakelijkheid van zoekmachines. Uitzondering zonder regels of regels zonder 
uitzondering?, Computerrecht 2008, p. 15; S. van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: 
How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, IIC 38 (2007), p. 669; D.B. Sherman, Cost and Resource 
Allocation Under the Orphan Works Act of 2006: Would the Act Reduce Transaction Costs, Allocate Orphan 
Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of Copyright Law?, Virginia Journal of Law & Technology 12(2007), p. 
13.
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Article 13 TRIPS and played a decisive role during the negotiations of the WIPO ‘Internet’ 
Treaties.36 In Article 10(1) WCT, it paved the way for agreement on limitations of the rights 
newly granted under the WIPO Copyright Treaty, including the right of online making 
available as part of the general right of communication to the public.37
A line between the international three-step test and open-ended fair use provisions, such as the 
US fair use doctrine, can easily be drawn. The prohibition of a conflict with a normal 
exploitation, for instance, recalls the fourth factor of the US fair use doctrine ‘effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’38 The drafting history of the 
three-step test confirms that the flexible formula has its roots in the Anglo-American 
copyright tradition.39 In the context of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, it has moreover been 
clarified that the international test, indeed, constitutes a means of enabling limitations and 
enhancing the flexibility of the copyright system:
‘It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry 
forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and 
exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the 
Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit 
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the 
digital network environment.’40
At the national level, the three-step test has been used in this enabling sense,41 for instance, in 
decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice. In a 1999 case concerning the Technical 
  
36 With regard to the evolution of this ‘family’ of copyright three-step tests in international copyright law, see 
Senftleben, supra note 13, 43-98; N. Dittrich, Der Dreistufentest, in: N. Dittrich (ed.), Beiträge zum Urheberrecht 
VIII, Wien 2005, p. 63; J. Bornkamm, Der Dreistufentest als urheberrechtliche Schrankenbestimmung – Karriere 
eines Begriffs, in: H.-J. Ahrens/J. Bornkamm/W. Gloy/J. Starck/J. von Ungern-Sternberg, Festschrift für Willi 
Erdmann zum 65. Geburtstag, Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München: Carl Heymanns 2002, p. 29.
37 As a consequence, the three-step test of Article 10(1) WCT is the central threshold for limitations on the right 
of making available online. As to the debate in the context of the WIPO ‘Internet’ Treaties, see Senftleben, supra 
note 13, 96-98; M. Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet – The 1996 WIPO Treaties, their Interpretation 
and Implementation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002; J. Reinbothe/S. Von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 
1996 – Commentary and Legal Analysis, Butterworths 2002.
38 Cf. Section 107 of the US Copyright Act. With regard to the application of fair use analyses concerning the 
fourth factor in the context of the three-step test, see Senftleben, supra note 13, 184-187. 
39 See observation by the United Kingdom, Doc. S/13, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of 
Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967, Geneva: WIPO 1971, p. 630. Cf. Senftleben, supra note 13, p. 47-52.
40 See Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
41 In fact, the three-step test has been understood in the sense of an ‘enabling’ provision allowing countries to 
satisfy their individual social, cultural and economic needs already at the time when the test was first developed 
and incorporated in Article 9(2) BC. At the 1967 Stockholm Conference, the test was perceived as a flexible 
framework, within which national legislators would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national limitations and 
satisfying the aforementioned domestic needs. See Doc. S/1, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of 
Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967, Geneva: WIPO 1971, p. 81. Cf. A. Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland 
Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series No. 08-04 (2008), online available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317707; C. Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, IIC 
37 (2006), p. 683 (694-696); M.R.F. Senftleben, Grundprobleme des urheberrechtlichen Dreistufentests, GRUR 
International 2004, p. 200 (206-207). For an overview of national case law applying the three-step test as a 
flexible standard, see J. Griffiths, The ‘Three-Step Test’ in European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions, 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 2009, p. 489, online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476968. For a proposal 
to use the three-step test as an instrument to delineate the exclusive rights of copyright owners, see D. Gervais, 
Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review 9 (2005), p. 1.
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Information Library Hannover, the Court underlined the public interest in unhindered access 
to information. Accordingly, it offered support for the Library’s practice of copying and 
dispatching scientific articles on request by single persons and industrial undertakings.42 The 
legal basis of this practice was the statutory limitation for personal use in § 53 of the German 
Copyright Act. Under this provision, the authorized user need not necessarily produce the 
copy herself but is free to ask a third party to make the reproduction on her behalf. The Court 
admitted that the dispatch of copies came close to a publisher’s activity.43 Nonetheless, it 
refrained from putting an end to the library practice by assuming a conflict with a work’s 
normal exploitation. Instead, the Court deduced an obligation to pay equitable remuneration 
from the three-step test, and enabled the continuation of the information service in this way.44
In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and storing of press articles for internal e-mail 
communication in a private company, the Court gave a further example of its flexible 
approach to the three-step test. It held that digital press reviews had to be deemed permissible 
under § 49(1) of the German Copyright Act just like their analogue counterparts, if the digital 
version – in terms of its functioning and potential for use – essentially corresponded to 
traditional analogue products.45 To overcome the problem of an outdated wording of § 49(1) 
that seemed to indicate the limitation’s confinement to press reviews on paper,46 the Court 
stated that, in view of new technical developments, a copyright limitation may be interpreted 
extensively.47 Taking these considerations as a starting point, the Court arrived at the 
conclusion that digital press reviews were permissible, if articles were included in graphical 
format without offering additional functions, such as a text collection and an index. This 
extension of the analogue press review exception to the digital environment, the Court 
maintained, was in line with the three-step test.48
Hence, the test can be used to enable limitations and enhance flexibility in copyright law. 
National legislation adopting a fair use approach, however, goes beyond the described court 
decisions. It allows the courts to create new limitations on the basis of abstract factors instead 
of entrusting them merely with the flexible interpretation of pre-defined, specific exceptions. 
In other words, national fair use legislation ‘institutionalizes’ the function of enabling 
limitations which the international three-step test has because of its open-ended wording. The 
  
42 See German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), February 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, 
Juristenzeitung 1999, p. 1000, with case comment by H. Schack. For an English description of the case, see 
Senftleben, supra note 13, p. 206-208.
43 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 1004.
44 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 1005-1007. Cf. P. Baronikians, Kopienversand durch Bibliotheken –
rechtliche Beurteilung und Vorschläge zur Regelung, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 1999, p. 126. In 
the course of subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act, the German legislator modelled a new copyright 
limitation on the Court’s decision. § 53a of the German Copyright Act goes beyond the court decision by 
including the dispatch of digital copies in graphical format.
45 See German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), July 11, 2002, case I ZR 255/00, GRUR 2002, p. 
963; Juristenzeitung 2003, p. 473, with case comment by Th. Dreier. Cf. Th. Hoeren, Pressespiegel und das 
Urheberrecht, GRUR 2002, p. 1022.
46 § 49(1) of the German Copyright Act, as in force at that time, referred to ‘Informationsblätter’.
47 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 966-966.
48 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 966-967. The Court referred to the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the EC 
Copyright Directive 2001/29. The EC three-step test enshrined in this provision, however, does not deviate from 
the international three-step test.
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abstract criteria of the three-step test may be used as a model for national fair use factors in 
this context.49
Nonetheless, doubt has been cast upon the permissibility of fair use legislation on the grounds 
that a national fair use system could not be qualified as a ‘certain special case’ in the sense of 
the three-step test.50 This counterargument is based on the three-step tests of Article 13 TRIPS 
and Article 10(2) WCT. In contrast to the aforementioned Article 9(2) BC and Article 10(1) 
WCT, these tests do not primarily serve as a basis for national limitations. Article 13 TRIPS 
and Article 10(2) WCT rather constitute additional safeguards seeking to ensure that all kinds 
of copyright limitations keep within the limits of the three-step test.51 Interpreting the TRIPS
test, however, the WTO Panel reporting on Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act did not 
endorse the view that fair use, by definition, was incompatible with the requirement of 
‘certain special cases’. Instead, the Panel followed a more cautious approach:
‘However, there is no need to identify explicitly each and every possible situation to 
which the exception could apply, provided that the scope of the exception is known 
and particularised. This guarantees a sufficient degree of legal certainty.’52
In this way, the Panel left room for national copyright laws providing for fair use. Legal 
certainty is not necessarily an exclusive task of the legislator. It may be divided between law 
makers and judges. In fair use systems, the degree of legal certainty need not be lower than in 
systems with specific, statutory limitations. The open factors constituting the fair use criteria 
allow the courts to determine ‘certain special cases’ of permissible unauthorized use in the 
light of the individual circumstances of a given case. With every court decision, a further 
‘special case’ becomes known, particularized and thus ‘certain’ in the sense of the three-step 
test. A sufficient degree of legal certainty follows from established case law instead of 
  
49 As to the application of the three-step test criteria in the framework of a fair use weighing process, see K.J. 
Koelman, Fixing the Three-Step Test, EIPR 2006, p. 407. However, see also the conclusions drawn by Griffiths, 
supra note 41, who doubts that the three-step test offers an appropriate basis for fair use provisions.
50 As to the debate on the impact of the three-step test on open-ended limitations, such as the US fair use 
doctrine, cf. Förster, supra note 11, 191-201; Senftleben, supra note 13, 133-137 and 162-168; Bornkamm, supra 
note 36, 45-46; H. Cohen Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and their Abuse, EIPR 2005, p. 359; S. Ricketson, 
The three-step test, deemed quantities, libraries and closed exceptions, Centre for Copyright Studies 2003, p. 
147-154; M.R.F. Senftleben, Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use, 
AMI 2003, p. 10; M. Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information Marketplace, Ohio State 
Law Journal 62 (2001), p. 849; R. Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 39 (2000, p. 75 (116-130); J.E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United 
States: Will Fair Use Survive?, EIPR 1999, p. 236; T. Newby, What’s Fair Here is not Fair Everywhere: Does 
the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, Stanford Law Review 1999, p. 1633.
51 For a discussion of the different functions of the three-step test, and the difference between Articles 9(2) BC 
and 10(1) WCT on the one hand, and Articles 13 TRIPS and 10(2) WCT on the other, see Senftleben, supra note 
13, 118-125.
52 See WTO Document WT/DS160/R, online available at www.wto.org, para. 6.108. For comments on the 
report, see M.R.F. Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? – WTO 
Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark 
Law, IIC 37 (2006), p. 407; M. Ficsor, How Much of What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two 
Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, RIDA 192 (2002), p. 111; J. Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel 
Decision on the Three-Step Test, Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 25 (2002), p. 119; D.J. Brennan, The 
Three-Step Test Frenzy – Why the TRIPS Panel Decision might be considered Per Incuriam, Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 2002, p. 213; J. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision 
and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, RIDA 2001, p. 13; P.B. Hugenholtz, De wettelijke 
beperkingen beperkt. De WTO geeft de driestappentoets tanden, Tijdschrift voor Auteurs-, Media- en 
Informatierecht (AMI) 2000, p. 197.
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detailed legislation. For instance, a sufficient degree of legal certainty can be attained in a 
system with a long-standing fair use tradition, such as the US copyright system.53
Moreover, it is to be recalled that flexible law making in the field of copyright limitations is a 
particular feature of the Anglo-American copyright tradition. At the international level, a
WTO Panel can be expected to take into account both the continental-European and the 
Anglo-American tradition of copyright law. The Panel’s formula of ‘a sufficient degree of 
legal certainty’ can thus be understood to ensure that not only precisely-defined civil law 
exceptions but also common law fair use limitations are capable of passing the test of ‘certain 
special cases’. Otherwise, an entire tradition of legal thinking would be discredited and 
declared incompatible with international standards.
In national systems switching from a closed list of statutory exceptions to an open-ended fair 
use approach, the required degree of legal certainty can be secured by applying case law 
established under the old system as a basis of the new fair use system. In mixed systems 
combining several statutory exceptions with an open fair use clause, the listed statutory 
exceptions can be regarded as examples of permissible fair use that can serve as a reference 
point for the courts. Considering the standard set forth by the WTO Panel, international 
copyright law, therefore, does not preclude any variant of fair use. With the open-ended 
factors of special cases, normal exploitation, legitimate interests and unreasonable prejudice, 
the international three-step test itself can be perceived as a source of inspiration for flexible 
law making in the field of copyright limitations rather than an obstacle to the introduction of
national fair use systems.
3. EC Worst Case Scenario
In the current online environment, more flexibility in the field of copyright limitations is a 
legislative necessity rather than an interpretative option. From an economic perspective, the 
web 2.0, with its advanced search engines, interactive platforms and various forms of user-
generated content, creates a parallel universe of traditional content providers relying on 
copyright protection, and emerging internet industries whose further development depends on 
robust copyright limitations. In particular, the newcomers in the online market – social 
networking sites, video forums and virtual worlds – promise a remarkable potential for 
economic growth that already attracted the attention of the OECD.54 Against this background, 
it is advisable to introduce fair use elements.55
The inefficiency of systems ignoring the merits of flexible copyright limitations can currently 
be observed in the EC. The adaptation of EC copyright law to the digital environment has led 
  
53 In this sense already Senftleben, supra note 13, 162-168. Cf. B. Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright 
Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, University of Pennsylavania Law Review 156 (2008), p. 549. However, see the 
critical comments by Förster, supra note 11, 197-201, on the unrestricted openness of the US system. With 
regard to the predictability of fair use decisions, see also D. Nimmer, ‘Fairest of Them All’ and Other Fairy 
Tales of Fair Use, Law and Contemporary Problems 66 (2003), p. 263. 
54 See OECD, Participative Web: User-Created Content, document DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/Final, dated April 12, 
2007, online available at http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/browseit/9307031E.PDF. Cf. Th. Dreier, Primär- und 
Folgemärkte, in: G. Schricker/Th. Dreier/A. Kur, Geistiges Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2001, p. 51; C. Geiger, Die Schranken des Urheberrechts als Instrumente der Innovationsförderung –
Freie Gedanken zur Ausschließlichkeit im Urheberrecht, GRUR International 2008, p. 459.
55 See M.R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in The Netherlands - A Renaissance?, Tijdschrift voor auteurs, media en 
informatierecht (AMI) 2009, p. 1, online available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986.
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to a legislative framework that imposes a heavy burden on users of copyrighted material.
Elements of both traditions of copyright law have been combined in the most unfortunate 
way. In the Copyright Directive 2001/29, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article 5 set forth a 
closed catalogue of exceptions. This enumeration is in line with the continental-European 
copyright tradition. The listed exceptions, however, are subject to a three-step test laid down 
in paragraph 5.56 This inclusion of a provision with open-ended criteria recalls the Anglo-
American copyright tradition.57 However, the interplay between the two elements – the closed 
catalogue and the open three-step test – is regulated as follows:
‘The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be 
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rightholder.’58
This approach, inevitably, leads to a dilemma. If anything, a closed list of precisely-defined 
exceptions has the advantage of enhanced legal certainty.59 This potential advantage, 
however, is beyond reach under the current EC system. If national legislation adopts and 
further specifies exceptions from the EC catalogue, these specific national exceptions may 
still be challenged on the grounds that they are incompatible with the EC three-step test. In 
other words, national exceptions that are already embedded in an inflexible national
framework may further be restricted by invoking the three-step test. On the one hand, national 
copyright exceptions are thus straitjacketed. Their validity is hanging by the thread of 
compliance with the abstract criteria of the EC three-step test. On the other hand, the test itself 
is deprived of the above-described enabling function which characterizes the international 
three-step test. The EC test may be invoked to further restrict national exceptions. However, it 
cannot be employed by the courts to create new, additional forms of permitted unauthorized 
use. Hence, it is impossible to realize the central advantage of flexibility that is inherent in 
open norms with abstract criteria.60
  
56 As to the drafting history of this hybrid framework for copyright exceptions, see M. Hart, The Proposed 
Directive for Copyright in the Information Society: Nice Rights, Shame about the Exceptions, EIPR 1998, p. 
169; P.B. Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, EIPR 2000, p. 499; 
D.J.G. Visser, De beperkingen in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media en informatierecht
2001, p. 9; F. Bayreuther, Beschränkungen des Urheberrechts nach der neuen EU-Urheberrechtsrichtlinie, 
Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 2001, p. 828; J. Reinbothe, Die EG-Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht in der 
Informationsgesellschaft, GRUR International 2001, p. 733.
57 As pointed out, supra note 38, a line between the criteria of the three-step test and open fair use factors can 
easily be drawn. The criterion of ‘no conflict with a normal exploitation’, for instance, resembles the fourth fair 
use factor ‘effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work’.
58 See Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC.
59 Cf. H. Cohen Jehoram, Fair use – die ferne Geliebte, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media en informatierecht 1998, 
p. 174, Implementatie van de Auteursrechtrichtlijn – De stille strijd tegen een spookrijder, Nederlands 
Juristenblad 2002, p. 1690, Nu de gevolgen van trouw en ontrouw aan de Auteursrechtrichtlijn voor fair use, 
tijdelijke reproductie en driestappentoets, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media en infomatierecht 2005, p. 153, Wie is 
bang voor de driestappentoets in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn?, in: N.A.N.M. van Eijk/P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.), 
Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel 2008, p. 57
60 Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in the Netherlands – a Renaissance?, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en 
informatierecht 2009, p. 1, online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986; Griffiths, supra note 41, 495; 
Geiger, supra note 41, 683; K.J. Koelman, De nationale driestappentoets,Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media en 
informatierecht 2003, p. 6. The restrictive nature and freezing effect of the EC copyright three-step test has been 
confirmed by the ECJ, July 16, 2009, case C-5/08, Infopaq/Danske Dagblades Forening. The Court pointed out 
that the precisely-defined exception of Article 5(1) of the EC Copyright Directive, in addition, had to satisfy the 
criteria of the three-step test laid down in Article 5(5).
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In consequence, the current EC system provides neither sufficient flexibility for copyright 
limitations nor sufficient legal certainty for users of copyrighted material. It combines the two 
disadvantages of the Anglo-American and the continental-European approach. The corrosive 
effect of the hybrid EC concept can currently be observed in the Netherlands. Dutch courts 
applied the three-step test already prior to the Copyright Directive.61 On the one hand, the 
adoption and implementation of the Directive led to more frequent references to the three-step 
test that are made to confirm and strengthen findings equally following from domestic rules.62
This way of applying the three-step test has little impact on the Dutch catalogue of statutory 
exceptions. On the other hand, however, the Directive inspired a line of decisions that use the 
three-step test to override the closed Dutch system of precisely-defined user privileges.63
In a decision of June 25, 2008, the District Court of The Hague, for instance, invoked the 
three-step test in a case concerning the payment of equitable remuneration for private copying 
activities. In this context, the Court devoted attention to the question of use of an illegal 
source as a basis for private copying.64 The detailed regulation of private copying in Article
16c of the Dutch Copyright Act does not contain any indication to the effect that private 
copying from an illegal source is to be deemed impermissible. The drafting history of the 
provision, by contrast, reflects the clear intention of the Dutch legislator to exempt private 
copying irrespective of whether a legal or illegal source is used.65 Having recourse to the 
three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive, the District Court of The Hague, 
nonetheless, dismantled this seemingly robust edifice of legal certainty in one single sentence. 
Without offering a detailed analysis, the Court stated that private copying from an illegal 
source was ‘in conflict with the three-step test’. Accordingly, it was held to fall outside the 
private copying exemption of Article 16c:
‘In the parliamentary history, there are indications of a different interpretation. 
However, the interpretation advocated by the minister and supported by the 
  
61 In the case ‘Zienderogen Kunst’, dating back to the year 1990, the Dutch Supreme Court invoked the three-
step test of Art. 9(2) of the Berne Convention to support its holding that the quotation of a work may not 
substantially prejudice the right holder’s interest in the exploitation of the work concerned. See Hoge Raad, June 
22, 1990, no. 13933, NJ 1991, p. 268 with case comment by J.H. Spoor; Informatierecht/AMI 1990, p. 202 with 
case comment by E.J. Dommering; Ars Aequi 40 (1991), p. 672 with case comment by H. Cohen Jehoram. 
62 In 2003, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals found that a parody did not harm the normal exploitation of the 
parodied work because it concerned a different market. See Gerechtshof Amsterdam, January 30, 2003, AMI 
2003, p. 94 with case comment by K.J. Koelman. In a 2006 decision concerning online advertisements 
reproducing the so-called ‘TRIPP TRAPP chair’, the Court of Zwolle-Lelystad referred to the three-step test of 
Art. 5(5) of the Directive in the context of Art. 23 of the Dutch Copyright Act – a limitation permitting the use of 
certain artistic works for the purpose of advertising their public exhibition or sale. The Court found that the use 
in question prejudiced the exploitation interest of the right holder. This was one of the reasons for denying 
compliance with Art. 23. See Rechtbank Zwolle-Lelystad, May 3, 2006, case no. 106031, LJN: AW 6288, AMI
2006, p. 179 with case comment by K.J. Koelman; Mediaforum 2006/9 with case comment by B.T. Beuving.
63 Besides the following example, see also District Court of The Hague (Rechtbank Den Haag), March 2, 2005, 
case no. 192880, LJN: AS 8778, Computerrecht 2005, p. 143 with case comment by K.J. Koelman. For an 
overview of national case law using the three-step test to further restrict statutory exceptions, see Griffiths, supra 
note 41, 493; Geiger, supra note 41, 683; C. Geiger, The Answer to the Machine Should not be the Machine: 
Safeguarding the Private Copy Exception in the Digital Environment, EIPR 2008, p. 121.
64 See Rechtbank Den Haag, June 25, 2008, case 246698, LJN BD5690, AMI 2008, p. 146 with case comment 
by C.B. van der Net. 
65 See the material quoted by the Rechtbank Den Haag, ibid., para. 4.4.1.
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government – assuming that private copying from an illegal source was legal – is in 
conflict with the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Directive.’66
The central point here is not the prohibition of private copying using illegal sources. It is the 
erosion of the central argument weighing in favour of precisely-defined exceptions and 
against a fair use system. Regardless of detailed definitions given in the Dutch Copyright Act,
the ruling of the Court minimizes the degree of legal certainty in the field of copyright 
limitations. Users of copyrighted material in the Netherlands can no longer rely on the 
wording of the applicable statutory exception. On the basis of the EC three-step test, a certain 
use may be held to amount to copyright infringement even though it is exempted from the 
authorization of the right holder in the Dutch Copyright Act.67
Hence, neither legal certainty nor sufficient flexibility can be attained. In EC copyright 
systems incorporating the three-step test into national law, such as the French system, this 
dilemma is at least made obvious for users relying on copyright exceptions.68 The problem as 
such, however, is not solved. When it is considered that, in addition, law making in the EC is 
much slower than in individual countries, it becomes clear that current EC copyright law 
causes a high risk of missing opportunities for cultural, social and economic development that 
arise from the web 2.0. The process of updating EC copyright legislation requires not only 
agreement at Community level but also national implementation acts in all Member States. 
Without fair use provisions in the field of copyright limitations, this process will be far too 
slow to keep pace with the rapid development of the Internet. The current situation in the EC
is a worst case scenario.69
4. Conclusion
In copyright law, a broad grant of protection and exposure to fast technological developments 
justify a fair use approach. International obligations do not preclude national fair use 
legislation. The international three-step test, by contrast, can serve as a model for national fair 
use factors. Given the potential of the web 2.0 for social, cultural and economic development, 
it seems advisable to seize this opportunity of flexible law making. The example of the EC 
Copyright Directive testifies to the dilemma arising from a restrictive approach. If the three-
step test is employed to further restrict precisely-defined copyright exceptions, a copyright 
system is created that offers neither legal certainty nor sufficient flexibility.
  
66 See Rechtbank Den Haag, June 25, 2008, case 246698, LJN BD5690, AMI 2008, p. 146 with case comment 
by C.B. van der Net, para. 4.4.3.
67 See M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Privé-kopiëren in het licht van de driestappentoets – opmerkingen naar aanleiding van 
het vonnis van de Haagse rechtbank inzake de thuiskopie’, Intellectuele eigendom en reclamerecht 2008, p. 265.
68 See Art. L. 122-5 of the French Intellectual Property Act (Code de la propriété intellectuelle). Cf. A. Lucas/P. 
Sirinelli, ‘Chronique: Droit d’auteur et droits voisins’, Propriétés intellectuelles 2006, p. 297 (314-316); V.L. 
Benabou, ‘Patatras! A propos de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel du 27 juillet 2006, Propriétés 
intellectuelles 2006, p. 240; C. Geiger, The French Implementation of the Information Society Directive: a 
Disappointing Result of a Promising Debate, AMI 2008, p. 1. M.R.F. Senftleben, L’application du triple test: 
vers un système de fair use européen?, Propriétés intellectuelles 2007, p. 453. In the Netherlands, H. Cohen 
Jehoram advocates the inclusion of the three-step test in the Dutch Copyright Act. See references supra note 59.
69 See Senftleben, supra note 60, 2-4. To reduce the harm flowing from the Copyright Directive, the EC three-
step test should at least be construed flexibly. For guidelines in this regard, see C. Geiger/J. Griffiths/R.M. Hilty, 
Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-Step Test’ in Copyright Law, IIC 39 (2008), p. 707. For a 
fair use approach to the EC three-step test, see Senftleben, supra note 50, p. 10.
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V. Patents
While copyright law is characterized by a wide variety of limitations, patent law provides for 
a rather limited set of exceptions. In many national systems, these exceptions concern private 
use, scientific experimentation and certain forms of compulsory licensing. A patent fair use 
provision would be a remarkable step towards enhanced flexibility.70 Against this 
background, it seems advisable to ask first whether international patent law permits a fair use 
approach (1) before assessing the need for fair use (2), the scope of a potential patent fair use 
defence (3) and drawing conclusions (4).
1. Permissibility
In the course of the TRIPS negotiations, the copyright three-step test served as a model for a
corresponding patent provision. Article 30 TRIPS offers WTO Members the freedom to 
‘...provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.’
This patent three-step test deviates from the copyright provision in several ways. Instead of 
‘certain special cases’, Article 30 TRIPS requires ‘limited exceptions’. A conflict with a 
normal exploitation is permissible as long as it is not unreasonable. When assessing 
prejudices to legitimate interests, the interests of third parties are to be taken into account
besides those of the patent owner. 
With regard to fair use legislation, use of the term ‘limited exceptions’ instead of ‘certain 
special cases’ seems particularly relevant. Arguments against copyright fair use systems have 
been based on alleged shortcomings in the field of legal certainty. As discussed above, the 
standard of legal certainty established by the WTO Panel dealing with the copyright three-step 
test, however, can hardly be understood to militate against fair use legislation. The WTO 
Panel report in ‘Canada – Protection of Pharmaceutical Products’71 is even more cautious in 
this regard. Interpreting the patent three-step test, the Panel refrained from developing a 
separate requirement of legal certainty altogether. The report clarifies that the word ‘limited’
has to be given a meaning separate from the limitation implicit in the word ‘exception’ itself.
It has to be read ‘to connote a narrow exception – one which makes only a small diminution 
of the rights in question.’72 The reference point for determining limited exceptions is the 
curtailment of exclusive rights.73 A specific requirement of legal certainty, however, is sought 
in vain in the Panel’s discussion of the ‘limited exceptions’ test.74
  
70 Nevertheless, copyright fair use is used as a reference point in the discussion on more flexibility for exceptions 
to patent rights. See L.R. de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law about ‘Fair Use’ and Why Universities 
are Ignoring the Lesson, Orlando Law Review 84 (2005), p. 779; J.M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental 
Use Exemption From United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit 
Research and Development, Baylor Law Review 56 (2004), p. 917; M.A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair 
Use in Patent Law, Columbia Law Review 100 (2000), p. 1177 (1178). 
71 See WTO Document WT/DS114/R, online available at www.wto.org. For comments on the report, see Kur, 
supra note 41; Senftleben, supra note 52; Ficsor, supra note 52.
72 See WTO Panel – Patents, ibid., para. 7.30.
73 See WTO Panel – Patents, ibid., para. 7.31.
74 See Senftleben, supra note 52, 419.
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Instead, the Panel focused on quantitative and qualitative factors to determine whether the 
Canadian exceptions at issue fulfilled the test. The stockpiling exception of Section 55.2(2) of 
Canada’s Patent Act was held not to constitute a ‘limited exception’. The provision allowed 
competitors to manufacture a stock of goods six months prior to the expiry of the patent, 
thereby encroaching upon the rights of ‘making’ and ‘using’ the patent.75 In this respect, the 
Panel emphasized that the exception contained ‘no limitations at all upon the quantity of 
production.’76 In the case of the Bolar-type regulatory review exception of Section 55.2(1) of 
Canada’s Patent Act, the Panel focused on qualitative considerations instead. The exception 
was countenanced on the grounds that it was confined to conduct needed to comply with the 
requirements of a regulatory approval process for pharmaceutical products, and would not 
allow commercial use.77
The ‘limited exceptions’ test, thus, requires a weighing process that includes quantitative and 
qualitative considerations. While the large volume of exempted production tipped the scales 
against the stockpiling exception, the confinement to use during the regulatory approval 
process saved the regulatory review exception. Compliance with this standard could be 
ensured by national courts on the basis of a national patent fair use system. Like the ‘certain 
special cases’ test in copyright law, the ‘limited exceptions’ test does not preclude fair use 
legislation. Article 17 TRIPS – the trademark provision corresponding to Article 30 TRIPS –
even refers to ‘limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of 
descriptive terms…’ Therefore, an obligation to set forth precisely-defined exceptions can 
hardly be derived from the word ‘exceptions’ or the expression ‘limited exceptions’. The 
TRIPS Agreement itself clarifies that fair use-type limitations may pass the test.
The remaining criteria of the patent three-step test are more flexible than their copyright 
counterparts. Article 30 requires that exceptions ‘do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation’. The word ‘unreasonably’ suggests that a conflict with a normal exploitation 
may be deemed reasonable under certain circumstances. The copyright three-step test, by 
contrast, prohibits conflicts with a normal exploitation in general. The last criterion of Article 
30 – no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests – contains a reference to third party 
interests that is missing in copyright law. This additional reference clarifies that prejudices to 
the legitimate interests of patent owners may be acceptable, if they can be justified in the light 
of legitimate third party interests.
In sum, the criteria of Article 30 thus offer more room for national fair use approaches than 
the copyright three-step test. As to the scope of patent fair use legislation, however, it is to be 
considered that the TRIPS Agreement distinguishes between exceptions to the rights of patent 
owners falling under the flexible conditions of Article 30, and ‘other use [...] without the 
authorization of the right holder’ that is regulated in much more detail in Article 31. This
detailed regulation concerns the grant of compulsory licenses at the national level, including 
licenses for the exploitation of dependent second patents. Given the rigidity of the rules set 
forth in Article 31, it is to be conceded that, in the area of compulsory licensing, international 
patent law does not leave room for flexible fair use elements. 
  
75 See Article 28(1) TRIPS and WTO Panel – Patents, fn. 1, para. 7.35.
76 See WTO Panel – Patents, ibid., para. 7.34.
77 See WTO Panel – Patents, ibid., para. 7.45.
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It is noteworthy, however, that the inflexibility of Article 31 led to an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement. The strict conditions established in the provision, such as the requirement 
of domestic market supply in subparagraph (f), may prevent countries with insufficient 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector from availing themselves of
compulsory licenses to ensure sufficient access to medicines. Recognizing this problem, 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted on 
November 14, 2001, provides for certain derogations from the obligations laid down in 
Article 31.78 This so-called ‘paragraph 6 system’ shows that the issue of compulsory licensing 
and its international regulation in Article 31 is particularly delicate. It may be seen as an 
indication that the international patent framework itself could be improved by replacing the 
rigid Article 31 with a more flexible standard including fair use elements.79 This question, 
however, concerns the need for patent fair use provisions rather than the permissibility of 
national fair use approaches under the current set of international rules.
2. Need for Fair Use
As discussed above, factors weighing in favour of a fair use approach are broad exclusive 
rights that need to be counterbalanced, and exposure to rapid technological developments. In 
patent law, there can be little doubt about a broad grant of protection. The international 
minimum standard set forth in Article 28 TRIPS encompasses the rights of ‘making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes…’ In case of processes, the right 
relates to ‘using the process’ and products directly obtained through such use. In contrast to 
copyright law, however, patent protection depends on registration. In examination systems, 
the invention is scrutinized as to novelty and inventiveness during the registration procedure.
The factor ‘broad grant of protection’, therefore, seems to weigh less clearly in favour of fair 
use than in the case of copyright law. While exclusive rights are broad, access to these rights 
depends on a detailed examination. It may be argued that the filtering of subject matter as a 
result of the registration procedure keeps patent protection within pre-defined limits. 
Precisely-defined exceptions may be sufficient to ensure an appropriate counterbalance within 
the protection system.
The registration requirement, however, is of a procedural nature. As clarified in Article 27 
TRIPS, ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology…’ As long as the threshold requirements of novelty, inventiveness and 
industrial applicability are fulfilled, a patent is to be issued. Registration does not serve as a 
means to confine the system to a pre-defined circle of technologies. An unforeseen need for 
reconsidering and recalibrating the system may thus arise, just like in copyright law, from 
  
78 Cf. A. Law, Patents and Public Health: Legalising the Policy Thoughts in the Doha TRIPS Declarations of 14 
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new technological developments. The grant of patents for software and biotechnological 
inventions are examples of technology that have created a need for reconsidering the balance 
between freedom of use and protection of the right owner. Moreover, a need for recalibrating 
the balance in patent law can follow from external influence factors. Patented technology may 
be central to the provision of important public goods. The debate on patents and public health 
is currently supplemented with a debate on patents and measures against global warming.80 In 
sum, a broad grant of protection and exposure to new technologies justify to consider a fair 
use approach in patent law.
3. Scope of Fair Use
The central objective of patent fair use could be the facilitation of experimental use and 
follow-on innovation. Experiences in the field of copyright law show that fair use can serve as 
an engine of the productive reuse of existing material. So-called ‘transformative use’ is an 
important factor capable of justifying a finding of fair use, for instance, in the US copyright
system.81 With regard to patents, it is noteworthy that the WTO Panel applying Article 30 
TRIPS referred to the patent policy of facilitating the dissemination and advancement of 
technical knowledge in the context of the ‘legitimate interests’ test. The Panel explained that
the requirement in patent law, that the nature of the invention be disclosed to the public, 
would partly be frustrated if the patent owner could prevent experimental use during the term 
of the patent. Both society and the scientist had a ‘legitimate interest’ in using the patent 
disclosure to support the advance of science and technology.82 This line of argument supports
a flexible framework for experimental use.83
More flexibility in the field of experimental use may be required indeed. With courts refusing 
to apply the experimental use defence to research aimed at regulatory approval for marketing 
purposes, legislative action exempting this type of use had to be taken in many countries.84 In 
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ICI/Medicopharma (‘Atenolol’). Cf. M.H.D.B. Schutjens, Arzneimittelversuche und Patentrecht – Anmerkungen 
zum Urteil des Hoge Raad vom 18. Dezember 1992 – ‘Atenolol’, GRUR International 1993, p. 827. In both 
countries, a specific exception for the use of patented material to obtain marketing approval has been introduced 
–  19  –
the US, however, the experimental use defence is applied even more restrictively. Following
the traditional distinction between unjustified commercial and exempted non-commercial use, 
the Federal Circuit held in Madey vs. Duke that the use of Madey’s patents by the Duke 
University went beyond the scope of the experimental use defence because it furthered 
Duke’s overall business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty, 
and benefited Duke’s reputation. The Court concluded that
‘regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for 
commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s 
legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly 
limited experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or non-profit status of the user 
is not determinative.’85
Given the broad notion of commercial use applied in this case, and the increasing number of 
collaborative research involving universities and private companies, this approach renders the 
experimental use defence meaningless.86
Inspiration for reinstating the defence in the framework of fair use legislation can be found in 
the decisions Clinical Trials I and II of the German Federal Court of Justice. § 11 No. 2 of the
German Patent Act exempts ‘acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject 
matter of the patented invention’.87 The decision Clinical Trials I concerned the use of 
patented material for the identification of new medical indications. In this context, the Court 
clarified that all kinds of experimental use were exempted to the extent to which the use 
served the purpose of obtaining knowledge and, therefore, concerned scientific research on 
the subject matter of the patented invention, including its application. In particular, it was not 
decisive whether the experiments were undertaken merely to review the particulars of the 
patent specification. Use for the purpose of obtaining new research results would also fall 
under the exception irrespective of whether the user had further intentions, such as use of the
results for commercial purposes.88 In Clinical Trials II, the Court confirmed that the defence 
applied to all experimental acts that relate to the subject matter of the invention, regardless of 
whether the tests produced purely scientific or industrially exploitable results. The defence 
could be invoked as long as the research did not specifically aim at impeding or frustrating the 
sale of the original product.89
    
in the meantime. See § 271(e) of the US Patent Act and Article 53(4) of the Dutch Patent Act. With regard to 
this statutory solution, see K.J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate 
Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress, in: P.K. Yu (ed.), Intellectual Property and Information 
Wealth, Westport: Praeger Publishers 2006, p. 107 (112-115).
85 See US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), Madey vs. Duke University.
86 Cf. G. Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the 
Bayh-Dole Act, Minnisota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 7 (2006), p. 393; J.L. Owens, ‘Not Quite 
Dead Yet’: The Near Fatal Wounding of the Experimental Use Exception and its Impact on Public Universities, 
Journal of Telecommunication and High Tech Law 3 (2005), p. 453; D.G. Sewell, Rescuing Science From the 
Courts: An Appeal for Amending the Patent Code to Protect Academic Research in the Wake of Madey vs. Duke 
University, Georgetown Law Journal 93 (2005), p. 759; T.V. Garde, The Effect of Disparate Treatment of the 
Experimental Use Exemption on the Balancing Act of 35 U.S.C. § 104, IIC 35 (2004), p. 241.
87 Like corresponding provisions in many other European countries, this article has been modelled on Article 
27(b) of the Community Patent Convention. Cf. W.R. Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in 
European Community States, IIC 29 (1998), p. 735 (735-736).
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The conceptual contours of a patent fair use defence could be drawn along the lines of these 
German decisions. Fair use could particularly aim at providing more flexibility in the area of 
follow-on innovation by exempting research that is carried out to understand and improve the 
invention, explore new fields of application or design around it. In these cases, it should be 
possible to invoke the defence even when the experiments, ultimately, aim at the commercial 
exploitation of research results.90 In consequence, the defence could be applied more broadly 
and support the advance of science and technology more efficiently than the current restrictive 
approach. Patent fair use factors would permit the courts to weigh the detriment to the 
patentee against the benefits accruing from enhanced technical knowledge. The more 
substantial the technical advance to be expected from research, the more clearly the factors 
should weigh in favour of fair use.91 To facilitate the task of establishing a proportionate 
relation between the detriment to the patentee and the benefits for the researcher and the 
public, the courts should be entitled to provide, where necessary, for the payment of equitable 
remuneration. In this way, an additional balancing tool is provided that allows the courts to 
reduce the harm to the patentee to reasonable limits in cases where extensive experimental use 
needs to be justified under the fair use system.92
With a fair use doctrine of this type, the patent system would have less difficulty to cope with 
current challenges, for instance, in the field of computer software. The decision to protect 
computer programs as literary works under international copyright standards indicates that, in 
line with the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law, concepts, methods and processes 
underlying a computer program should remain free. In addition, copyright law provides for 
exceptions to enable the decompilation of the program for the purpose of achieving 
interoperability.93 As innovation in the software sector is known to occur in small incremental 
steps, it is advisable to preserve this breathing space for follow-on innovation when software
is additionally patented. Otherwise, patent protection may become too heavy a burden, in 
particular, for small and medium-sized enterprises not involved in the patenting of software 
and, therefore, unable to pool patent portfolios to obtain use permissions for patented 
algorithms and interfaces.94
A restrictive approach to experimental use does not permit the reverse engineering of patented
software with the aim to use the knowledge about the deciphered interface to develop a new
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product that can be marketed.95 A patent fair use defence that can be invoked irrespective of 
commercial motivations, by contrast, would enable this experimental use in line with 
applicable copyright standards. As shown by the analysis conducted by O’Rourke, patent fair 
use could prevent software patents from unduly impeding competition. The use of interfaces 
for achieving interoperability would remain possible. In this context, the payment of equitable 
remuneration could play an important role:
‘…patent fair use would give the infringer a threat to use in negotiations, increasing 
the chances that the parties will reach a socially beneficial licensing agreement. By 
placing the compensation rate, if any, at something less than market value, the 
patentee is less likely to view competition through reverse engineering as an empty 
threat. […] Yet, if the patentee refuses to license, the fair use doctrine could act as a 
safety valve, excusing the infringement when it would be socially beneficial.’96
Patent fair use could also have beneficial effects in areas of technology where the high
number of patents creates an ‘anti-commons’: rights are held by so many different owners that 
the costs of accumulating all required licenses for an envisaged production become 
prohibitively high. This problem has been identified, for instance, in the field of
biotechnology.97 With a fair use system extending the scope of the experimental use defence 
to commercially-motivated activities, research use could be exempted that is undertaken to 
find ways of inventing around the patent for the purpose of enabling a production for which 
the necessary license cannot be obtained. In situations where a developer has already amassed 
the majority of the required licenses to market a product, this freedom may serve as a catalyst 
inducing the patentee of the remaining technology to enter into a licensing agreement.98
A patent fair use system could also broaden the experimental use defence with regard to use 
that does not concern research ‘on’ but ‘with’ the patented invention.99 This broader notion of 
research use is beyond the scope of systems that, like legislation in most European countries,
exempt experiments only insofar as the use aims at enhancing knowledge on the used 
patented invention itself. As indicated above, German legislation, for instance, only covers
‘acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention.’
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As a result, use that employs a patented technology to examine the properties of something 
else falls outside the scope of the exemption. In particular, the confinement to research on the 
patented technology constitutes an obstacle to the unauthorized use of research tools. This 
restriction may be unjustified in the case of tools developed by non-profit inventors who are 
not primarily motivated by the prospect of commercial sales.100 An even broader approach has 
been developed by Strandburg. She proposes to extend the exemption for experimental use to
all kinds of research tools, including those developed by commercial inventors. With regard to
the effect of this blanket exemption on the disclosure of technology, Strandburg’s analysis 
indicates that the benefits of earlier availability of research tool inventions to researchers is 
likely to outweigh the social costs of later tool disclosure.101 Considering the impact on 
commercial suppliers, she argues that 
‘[r]esearchers will buy many tools from suppliers whether or not the tools are 
patented, simply as a matter of efficiently allocating limited researcher time and 
resources. Because tool suppliers will already rationally focus on developing research
tools and tool improvements that researchers will buy rather than make, a research use 
exemption may have little impact, simply bolstering that preference.’102
A fair use framework would avoid disproportionate harm in this context. Given the unclear
impact of a general experimental use exemption on research tool disclosure and commercial 
supply, a nuanced fair use weighing process seems more appropriate than the blanket solution 
proposed by Strandburg. With factors weighing in favour of follow-on innovation, but against 
use free of charge in standard research procedures, a fair use system could support the use of 
research tools for the advancement of technical knowledge without encroaching upon the 
market for non-inventive standard applications, such as standard trials in the medical sector.
Article 30 TRIPS prohibits ‘unreasonable’ conflicts with a normal exploitation. The interests 
of third parties, such as researchers and the public at large, are to be factored into the equation
when assessing ‘unreasonable’ prejudices to the legitimate interests of patent owners. These 
tests of reasonableness could be translated into national fair use legislation to ensure that the 
exemption of research use, covering experiments ‘on’ as well as ‘with’ patented technology, 
keeps within justifiable, reasonable limits.103
As indicated above, international patent law itself may also be considered a field of 
application for patent fair use legislation. The ‘paragraph 6 system’ following from the Doha 
Declaration testifies to the enormous difficulty of readjusting the detailed requirements laid 
down in Article 31 TRIPS. Against this background, the time seems ripe to consider a
deliberate opening of the current system by introducing more flexible requirements. Factors to 
be considered could be an urgent need to provide certain public goods, such as public health 
and measures against global warming.104 It is to be considered also that Article 31(l) governs 
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compulsory licenses in the area of dependent second patents. More flexibility in this field 
would be consistent with the proposed fair use defence. Given the small, incremental steps of 
follow-on innovation in the software industry, for instance, it is doubtful whether the 
requirement of ‘an important technical advance of considerable economic significance’ is an 
appropriate threshold for the grant of compulsory licenses.
4. Conclusion
Like in copyright law, broad exclusive rights and challenges arising from new technologies 
justify flexible fair use legislation in the area of patents. As the patent disclosure rationale, 
ultimately, aims at the use of disclosed know-how for the further advancement of science and 
technology, it is consistent to adopt a fair use standard that offers an open, flexible framework 
for experimental use and follow-on innovation. The application of fair use factors in this area 
can be expected to inhibit patent protection from impeding innovation without becoming an 
obstacle to investment in research and development and the disclosure of technology. The 
system will have beneficial effects in areas where innovation occurs in small, incremental 
steps, like in the software industry. It will also help to alleviate the problem of the anti-
commons that has been identified, for instance, in the field of biotechnology.
VI. Trademarks
Trademarked identifiers of commercial source are reserved for one individual market 
participant as long as this trader continues to use the sign. The focus of trademark fair use, 
therefore, is likely to differ from the concepts discussed so far. While copyright and patent 
fair use systems may primarily aim to support transformative use and follow-on innovation, 
trademark fair use can be expected to be concerned predominantly with alleviating the rigours 
of a stable system of potentially indefinite protection. It will aim to keep certain signs 
available for use by all traders or the public at large.105 It may also aim to reconcile trademark 
protection with competing interests, such as freedom of speech, that are not represented 
adequately in the trademark system focusing on the relation between traders.106 Again, the 
question of fair use permissibility will be raised (1) before assessing the need for fair use (2), 
analysing existing fair use approaches (3) and making concluding remarks (4).
    
Global Public Goods, in: K.E. Maskus/J.H. Reichman (eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
105 Cf. J. Phillips, Trade Mark Law and the Need to Keep Free – Intellectual Property Monopolies Have Their 
Limits, IIC 36 (2005), p. 389; Th. Sambuc, Das Freihaltebedürfnis an beschreibenden Angaben und der Ware 
selbst nach dem Markengesetz, GRUR 1997, p. 403. For a general analysis of the evolution of limitations in 
trademark law, see G.B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing 
Defenses in Trademark Law, Lewis and Clark Law Review 13/1 (2009), p. 99.
106 Cf. W. Sakulin, Trademark Protection and Freedom of Expression – An Analysis into the Conflict Between 
Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression Under European, German and Dutch Law, Amsterdam 2010; C. 
Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property?, IIC 35 (2004), p. 268; L. 
Timbers/J. Huston, The ‘Artistic Relevance Test’ Just Became Relevant: the Increasing Strength of the First 
Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilution, Trade Mark Reporter 93 (2003), p. 1278; R. 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to 
Love Ambiguity, in: (eds.), Trademark Law and Theory: a Handbook of Contemporary Research, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2008, p. 261.
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1. Permissibility
Article 17 TRIPS allows WTO Members to
‘...provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of 
descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate 
interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.’
This trademark test deviates significantly from the three-step tests in copyright and patent 
law. However, it does not preclude national fair use legislation. As discussed above, the 
requirement of ‘limited exceptions’ does not preclude open-ended fair use legislation. In ‘EC 
– Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs’, the WTO Panel dealing with Article 17 followed the approach taken previously 
in the patent case concerning Article 30 TRIPS. It measured the extent to which a curtailment
of exclusive trademark rights resulted from national limitations – without requiring precisely-
defined exceptions.107 The remaining ‘legitimate interests’ test of Article 17 is much more 
flexible than the corresponding tests in Articles 13 and 30 TRIPS. It does not refer to an 
unreasonable prejudice. The WTO Panel inferred from this omission ‘a lesser standard of 
regard for the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark.’108 Most importantly, 
however, Article 17 itself gives the example of ‘fair use of descriptive terms’. As the words 
‘such as’ indicate, this example may be supplemented with other forms of fair use. The 
provision can hardly be understood to preclude the identification of further types of fair use at 
the national level on the basis of open-ended factors.
2. Need for Fair Use
During the last decades, the realm of trademark law has been extended continuously. Several 
new types of marks, such as colour per se, shape marks, sound marks and multimedia signs, 
have been recognized and accepted for registration.109 In addition, the exclusive rights of the 
trademark owner have been broadened constantly. This expansion may be less prominent in 
cases of similarity between the signs and the products involved. The current scope of 
protection in the area of similarity covers direct product confusion as well as indirect 
confusion with regard to affiliation and sponsorship. Highly distinctive marks enjoy broader 
protection. The showing of a likelihood of confusion, however, still constitutes the central 
requirement to be fulfilled before protection can be obtained.110
  
107 See WTO Document WT/DS174/R, para. 7.650-7.651, based on a complaint by the US and the twin report 
WTO Document WT/DS290/R dealing with a complaint by Australia. As to the interpretation of Art. 17 TRIPs, 
the reports are identical in substance. Following references concern the report on the US complaint. For 
comments on the report, see Senftleben, supra note 52.
108 See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 7.671.
109 Cf. I. Lewalter/P.T. Schrader, Die Fühlmarke, GRUR 2005, p. 476; F. Hauck, Aktuelle Entwicklungen bei der 
Eintragung von Farbmarken, GRUR 2005, p. 363; A. Kur, Alles oder Nichts im Formmarkenschutz?, GRUR 
International 2004, p. 755; A. Bouvel, Qu’importe le flacon... Le droit des marques malmené par les emballages, 
Propriétés Intellectuelles 2004, p. 863; R. Arnet, Markenschutz für Formen, sic! 2004, p. 829; J. Pagenberg, 
Trade Dress and the Three-Dimensional Marks – The Neglected Children of Trademark Law?, IIC 35 (2004), p. 
831; M. Bölling, Der EuGH und die abstrakte Farbmarke – Von der bewussten Entwertung einer Markenform, 
Markenrecht 2004, p. 384; S. Bingener, Das Wesen der Positionsmarke oder Wo die Positionsmarke hingehört, 
Markenrecht 2004, p. 377; A. Firth/E. Gredley/S.M. Maniatis, Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, Functional
Considerations and Consumer Perception, EIPR 2001, p. 86.
110 See ECJ, November 11, 1997, case C-251/95, Puma/Sabel. The confusion requirement in similarity cases has 
been confirmed in ECJ, June 18, 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 59. Cf. G. Würtenberger, Risk of 
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In the area of sign and product identity, however, there is a trend towards absolute protection 
that does no longer depend on a likelihood of confusion. In L’Oréal/Bellure, the ECJ attached
particular importance to the formula of absolute protection laid down in recital 11 of the EC 
Trademark Directive.111 According to the Court, absolute protection implies that, in cases of 
sign and product identity, a likelihood of confusion does not constitute ‘the specific condition 
for such protection’.112 This holding goes beyond Article 16(1) TRIPS that provides only for a 
presumption of a likelihood of confusion in double identity cases. The ECJ abandons the 
confusion requirement altogether and, instead, requires that a third party’s use of a trademark
affect or be liable to affect the functions of the trademark. These functions, however, are 
understood to
‘...include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to 
consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, in particular 
that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those of 
communication, investment or advertising.’113
With protection ranging from source identification to investment in brand image, this broad 
definition offers various possibilities of establishing a conflict.114 The only remaining hurdle 
seems to be the fact that the ECJ, so far, insists on some detriment to the trademark. Taking 
unfair advantage of a trademark’s functions is insufficient to satisfy the function test.115
Nevertheless, the mere showing of identity between signs and products will be decisive in 
many cases. As a result, EC trademark rights in the area of double identity come very close to 
the exclusive rights granted in copyright and patent law, where mere use of protected subject 
matter may amount to infringement.
Even more remarkable steps to broaden trademark protection, however, have been taken in 
the area of protection against dilution. Trademark rights in this field are becoming instruments 
    
Confusion and Criteria to Determine the Same in European Community Trade Mark Law, EIPR 2001, p. 20. For 
a comparison with the approach taken in the US, see J.T. McCarthy, ‘Dilution of a Trademark: European and 
United States Law Compared’, The Trademark Reporter 94 (2004), p. 1163.
111 See Directive 2008/95/EC. Recital 11 reads as follows: ‘The protection afforded by the registered trade mark, 
the function of which is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin, should be absolute in 
the case of identity between the mark and the sign and the goods or services. The protection should apply also in 
the case of similarity between the mark and the sign and the goods or services. It is indispensable to give an 
interpretation of the concept of similarity in relation to the likelihood of confusion…’
112 See ECJ, June 18, 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 59.
113 See ECJ, ibid., para. 58.
114 Cf. F. Hacker, Funktionenlehre und Benutzungsbegriff nach ‘L’Oréal’, Markenrecht 2009, p. 333; S. 
Völker/G. Elskamp, Die neuen Markenfunktionen des EuGH, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 2010, p. 64; K.-
H. Fezer, Markenschutzfähigkeit der Kommunikationszeichen (§§ 3 und 8 MarkenG) und 
Kommunikationsschutz der Marken (§§ 14 und 23 MarkenG), Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 2010, p. 165. 
With regard to the earlier focus of the ECJ on the ‘essential’ function of source identification, see I. Simon, How 
Does ‘Essential Function’ Doctrine Drive European Trade Mark Law, IIC 36 (2005), p. 401.
115 See the analysis concerning the advertising function in ECJ, March 23, 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 
Google/Louis Vuitton, para. 92: ‘…in the case where that use adversely affects the proprietor’s use of its mark as 
a factor in sales promotion or as an instrument of commercial strategy.’ Other language versions, such as the 
Dutch (‘afbreuk doen’), French (‘porter atteinte’) and German (‘beeinträchtigen’) versions, are clearer on that 
point. Cf. A. Ohly, comment on BGH, January 22, 2009, case I ZR 125/07, ‘Bananabay’, Juristenzeitung 2009, 
p. 856 (859).
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for the exploitation of brand image.116 Protection against dilution overrides the principle of 
specialty. It can be invoked against use of competing signs for similar and dissimilar products 
alike. To enter this area of protection, it is sufficient to show a mere risk of association – the 
establishment of a link between the mark and the competing sign in the minds of 
consumers.117 This entails the broadening of the notion of trademark use. In dilution cases, 
even decorative use of a sign that triggers associations with a protected mark may be qualified 
as relevant trademark use falling under the exclusive rights of the trademark owner.118 In 
certain trademark systems, such as the EC system and those of its Member States, the 
threshold for eligibility for anti-dilution protection, moreover, is remarkably low. The ECJ 
accepts niche reputation. It is sufficient that a significant part of the target consumer group in 
a substantial part of an EC Member State knows the mark.119 This low standard is in line with 
the approach taken at the international level in the WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning 
the Protection of Well-Known Marks.120
Besides the broadening of trademark protection, exposure to technological developments 
justifies the consideration of a fair use approach in the field of trademark law. The trademark 
system is increasingly challenged by developments in the digital environment.121 Difficult 
questions have already arisen, for instance, with regard to the use of trademarks for the 
purpose of keyword advertising.122
  
116 See M.R.F. Senftleben, The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC 
Law, IIC 40 (2009), p. 45; L. Bently/G. Davis/J. Ginsburg (eds.), Trade Marks and Brands – An Interdisciplinary 
Critique, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008; J. Moskin, ‘Victoria’s Big Secret: Whither Dilution 
Under the Federal Dilution Act?’, The Trademark Reporter 93 (2004), p. 842; K.-H. Fezer, Entwicklungslinien 
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117 See ECJ, October 23, 2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld Trading. See also ECJ, supra note 112.
118 See A. Kur, Confusion Over Use? – Die Benutzung ‚als Marke‘ im Lichte der EuGH-Rechtsprechung, GRUR 
International 2008, p. 1.
119 See ECJ, 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, General Motors/Yplon (‘Chevy’); ECJ, October 6, 2009, case 
C-301/07, Pago/Tirolmilch. Cf. Senftleben, supra note 115, 54 and 74-75.
120 See WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO: 
Geneva 2000, online available at www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/. Cf. Senftleben, supra note 115, 
51-53; A. Kur, Die WIPO-Vorschläge zum Schutz notorisch bekannter und berühmter Marken, GRUR 1999, p. 
866.
121 See WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial 
Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, WIPO: Geneva 2001, online available at www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/development_iplaw/. Cf. D. Seichter, Markenrecht und Internet, Markenrecht 2006, p. 375; C. Wichard, 
The Joint Recommendation Concerning Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on 
the Internet, in: J. Drexl/A. Kur (eds.), Intellectual Property and Private International Law, IIC Studies 24, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005, p. 257; A. Kur, Die WIPO-Empfehlungen zur Benutzung von Marken im 
Internet, GRUR International 2001, p. 961.
122 See ECJ, March 23, 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton. Cf. A. Ohly, Keyword-
Advertising auf dem Weg von Karlsruhe nach Luxemburg, GRUR 2009, p. 709; R. Knaak, Keyword 
Advertising – Das aktuelle Key-Thema des Europäischen Markenrechts, GRUR International 2009, p. 551; C. 
Well-Szönyi, Adwords: Die Kontroverse um die Zulässigkeit der Verwendung fremder Marken als 
Schlüsselwort in der französischen Rechtsprechung, GRUR International 2009, p.557; G. Engels, Keyword 
Advertising – Zwischen beschreibender, unsichtbarer und missbräuchlicher Verwendung, Markenrecht 2009, p. 
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3. Existing Approaches
Law makers in several jurisdictions have been alert to the need for flexible limitations in the 
area of trademark protection against dilution. After the US Supreme Court had required ‘a 
showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution’ in Moseley vs. V Secret 
Catalogue,123 the 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act amended the anti-dilution provisions 
in the US Lanham Act.124 The adoption of new anti-dilution legislation was accompanied by 
the introduction of a statutory, open-ended fair use provision focusing on breathing space for 
comparative advertising and freedom of speech without excluding other forms of fair use.125
EC legislation concerning dilution achieves similar results by providing for a defence of ‘due 
cause’. Article 5(2) of the EC Trademark Directive 2008/95 offers EC Member States the 
freedom to provide for anti-dilution protection
‘…where use of [a sign similar to a trademark having a reputation] without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of 
the trade mark.’
This provision made its way into the national trademark legislation of all Member States. As a 
result, the flexible ‘due cause’ defence can be used by national courts to counterbalance the 
broad grant of protection. The case ‘Lila Postkarte’ of the German Federal Court of Justice, 
for instance, concerned the marketing of postcards that alluded ironically to trademarks and 
advertising campaigns of the chocolate producer Milka. On purple background corresponding 
    
289; M. Schubert/S. Ott, AdWords – Schutz für die Werbefunktion einer Marke?, Markenrecht 2009, p. 338; O. 
Sosnitza, Adwords = Metatags? Zur marken- und wettbewerbsrechtlichen Zulässigkeit des Keyword Advertising 
über Suchmaschinen, Markenrecht 2009, p. 35; Ch. Gielen, Van adwords en metatags, in: N.A.N.M. van Eijk et 
al. (eds.), Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam: Cramwinckel 2008, p. 101; O. van Daalen/A. Groen, Beïnvloeding 
van zoekresultaten en gesponsorde koppelingen. De juridische kwalificatie van onzichtbaar merkgebruik, BMM 
Bulletin 2006, p. 106.
123 See Supreme Court of the United States of America, March 4, 2003, Moseley vs. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
537 U.S. 418 (2003). Cf. Moskin, Victoria’s Big Secret: Wither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act, 
Trademark Reporter 93 (2004), 842-859.
124 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (H.R. 683) amending the US Trademark Act of 1946 (15 
U.S.C. 1125). With regard to the required proof of dilution, this new legislation clarifies that protection against 
dilution is to be granted ‘regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of 
actual economic injury.’ Cf. B. Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 16 (2006), 1143.
125 Section 43(c)(3) of the US Lanham Act, as amended, reads as follows: 
‘(3) EXCLUSIONS – The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment 
under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a 
famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services, including use in connection with –
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the 
goods or services of the famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.’
For a description of the situation under the former US Federal Trademark Dilution Act, see M.K. Cantwell, 
Confusion, Dilution and Speech: First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update, The 
Trademark Reporter 94 (2004), p. 549. With regard to common law fair use defences in the US, see J. Moskin, 
Frankenlaw: The Supreme Court’s Fair and Balanced Look at Fair Use, Trademark Reporter 95 (2005), p. 848. 
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to Milka’s abstract colour mark, the postcard sought to ridicule the nature idyll with cows and 
mountains that is evoked in Milka advertising. It showed the following poem attributed to 
‘Rainer Maria Milka’:
‘Über allen Wipfeln ist Ruh,
irgendwo blökt eine Kuh.
Muh!’126
Assessing this ironic play with Milka insignia, the Court first confirmed the broad scope of 
protection. It held that for the use of Milka trademarks to constitute trademark use in the sense 
of Article 5(2) of the Trademark Directive, it was sufficient that the postcard called to mind 
the well-known Milka signs.127 Even though being decorative, the use in question, thus, gave 
rise to the question of trademark infringement. Accordingly, the Court embarked on a scrutiny 
in the light of the infringement criteria of detriment to distinctive character or repute, and the 
taking of unfair advantage. At this stage, however, Milka could not succeed. In line with the 
EC Directive, the German Trademark Act offers the defence of ‘due cause’. Weighing 
Milka’s concerns about a disparagement of the trademarks against the fundamental guarantee 
of the freedom of art, the Court concluded that the freedom of art had to prevail in light of the 
ironic statement made with the postcard.128 The use of Milka trademarks was found to have 
taken place with due cause.
These examples of flexible fair use defences in US and EC trademark legislation show that 
measures are taken to counterbalance broad protection in the field of trademark dilution. 
However, comparable steps have not been taken to limit trademark protection in cases of sign 
and product identity. As explained above, recent developments in the EC have led to absolute 
protection in double identity cases irrespective of whether a likelihood of confusion can be 
presumed. The EC provision governing this area is Article 5(1)(a) of the Trademark Directive. 
It vests the trademark owner with the right to prevent third parties from using in trade
‘…any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services 
which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered.’
In this provision, not only the requirement of (presumed) confusion is sought in vain. Article 
5(1)(a) also fails to provide for the ‘due cause’ defence that applies in the area of EC 
protection against dilution. This lack of balancing tools may become problematic soon. In the 
case of a trademark parody falling under Article 5(1)(a), such as T-shirts or cartoons 
parodying the trademarked Mickey Mouse drawing,129 it is unclear how the ECJ would 
provide for sufficient breathing space for freedom of speech. In principle, the approach taken 
by the ECJ leaves room for a finding that the use in question is not actionable under Article 
  
126 ‘It is calm above the tree tops, somewhere a cow is bellowing. Moo!’ See Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof), February 3, 2005, case I ZR 159/02, GRUR 2005, p. 583, ‘Lila Postkarte’. Cf. C. Born, Zur 
Zulässigkeit einer humorvollen Markenparodie – Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BGH ‘Lila Postkarte’, GRUR 
2006, p. 192.
127 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 584.
128 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 584-585. For a further case in which freedom of speech prevailed over 
trademark protection, see German Federal Court of Justice, March 11, 2008, case VI ZR 7/07, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2008, p. 2110, ‘Gen-Milch’. Cf. Sakulin, supra note 106; Geiger, supra note 106.
129 See the international Madrid registration no. 296478 relating, among various other products, to printed matter 
(class 16) and clothing (class 25). The particulars of the registration can be consulted online at 
<<http://www.wipo.int/ipdl/en/madrid/search-struct.jsp>>.
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5(1)(a) because it does not affect any of the protected functions of a trademark. The room to 
manoeuvre created in this way, however, must not be overestimated. As pointed out above, 
the circle of relevant functions has been drawn broadly in L’Oréal/Bellure. It includes 
communication, investment and advertising. A biting parody, however, will inevitably impact
on the way in which consumers perceive the target trademark. It may have a corrosive effect 
on a favourable trademark image that is the result of substantial investment in advertising and 
product control.130
The described dilemma has already arisen with regard to commercial speech. Harm to the 
investment and advertising function of a trademark can flow from comparative advertising 
that sheds new light on a trademark by informing consumers about better offers in the 
marketplace. The current, inflexible framework established by Article 5(1)(a) does not offer 
breathing space in this case. As the product comparison may interfere with the trademark 
communication initiated by the owner, affect prior investment in a favourable trademark 
image and reduce the trademark’s advertising power, the verdict of infringement seems 
inevitable under Article 5(1)(a), even if the requirement of detriment to trademark functions is 
applied.131 In L’Oréal/Bellure, the ECJ nonetheless managed to escape the inflexible rules on 
sign and product identity by invoking the EC Comparative Advertisement Directive.132 Using 
the criteria for permissible comparative advertising as an external balancing tool, the Court 
arrived at the conclusion that a case of infringement would only arise where a trademark was 
used for the purpose of comparative advertising without all the requirements stated in the 
Comparative Advertisement Directive being satisfied.133
To add flexibility to the EC trademark system in double identity cases, the ECJ, thus, had to
resort to the rules on comparative advertising. Against this background, the function analysis 
developed by the Court under Article 5(1)(a) of the Trademark Directive can hardly be 
qualified as a sufficient safeguard of artistic and commercial freedom of speech.134 Instead, 
EC trademark law seems incapable of providing the necessary room to manoeuvre. The 
constant broadening of protection has created a need for fair use provisions capable of 
counterbalancing EC trademark protection in the area of sign and product identity. The ‘due 
cause’ defence applied in dilution cases could serve as a model for satisfying this need. 
  
130 In the copyright fair use case Campbell vs. Acuff Rose, the US Supreme Court solved this problem by stating 
that ‘when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a 
harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.’ See Campbell vs. Acuff-Rose, 510 US 569 (1994), II D. A similar 
ECJ finding of fair use would be necessary to safeguard parody under Article 5(1)(a) of the EC Trademark 
Directive. 
131 The mere presumption of confusion in double identity cases would offer more flexibility. In cases of 
comparative advertising meeting the requirements stated in the EC Misleading and Comparative Advertisement 
Directive 2006/114/EC of December 12, 2006, it could be concluded that the presumption has been rebutted.
132 The Court dealt with the Misleading Advertisement Directive 84/450 of September 10, 1984, as amended by 
the Comparative Advertisement Directive 97/55 of October 6, 1997. These two Directives are now consolidated 
in the Misleading and Comparative Advertisement Directive 2006/114/EC of December 12, 2006.
133 See ECJ, June 18, 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 54 and 65.
134 It is doubtful whether the breathing space created in this way is sufficient to satisfy freedom of speech 
concerns. See Ohly, supra note 121, 711-712; A. Kur/L. Bently/A. Ohly, Sweet Smells and a Sour Taste – the 
ECJ’s L’Oréal Decision, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law Research 
Paper Series No. 09-12, online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492032.
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4. Conclusion
International trademark law does not prevent national law makers from introducing fair use 
limitations. The international framework of protection is even more flexible than in the field 
of copyright and patents. Given the constant broadening of trademark protection during the 
last decades, and the increasing impact of Internet technology, it is advisable to use this 
flexibility at the national level. In this context, examples of current EC and US legislation 
show that fair use elements have already been introduced to counterbalance protection against 
dilution. In the area of sign and product identity, recent extensions of protection in the EC 
necessitate the adoption of similar fair use solutions.  
VII. Conclusion
Fair use has become a horizontal issue in intellectual property law. As the analysis has shown, 
there are important reasons for the adoption of flexible fair use defences in copyright, patent 
and trademark law. The constant expansion of protection in these systems, and constant 
exposure to technological challenges, necessitate the introduction of flexible counterbalances 
that safeguard user freedoms. In copyright law, an open-ended fair use defence offers the
breathing space necessary for satisfying social, cultural and economic needs, particularly in 
the participative web 2.0. Transformative user-generated content can be encouraged. New 
Internet industries is given room to flourish. In patent law, fair use provisions can be 
employed to enhance flexibility in the area of experimental use. Follow-on innovation in the 
fields of software and biotechnology can be fostered in this way. The use of research tools can
be facilitated. In trademark law, fair use is required to counterbalance brand image protection 
against dilution, and the grant of absolute protection in cases of sign and product identity. A 
fair use defence would offer sufficient flexibility for freedom of speech, including commercial 
speech in cases of comparative advertising.
The continuous expansion of IP protection in recent decades, however, does not only create a 
need for fair use within individual IP domains. In addition, it is to be considered that the
expansion of protection broadened overlaps between the different branches of IP.135 Software 
patents create an overlap with copyright protection of computer programs. The recognition of
new types of marks, such as shape and sound marks, broadens the overlap between copyright 
and trademark protection. 
Hence, there is not only a need for fair use counterbalances within individual IP protection 
regimes but also a growing need for flexible balancing tools that can be applied across these 
individual regimes. A network of corresponding fair use limitations in different IP domains 
can serve as a means to safeguard the inner consistency of the IP system when it comes to
protection overlaps. On the basis of horizontal, open-ended fair use legislation, a form of 
unauthorized use that is permitted in one protection regime can be safeguarded in other, 
overlapping systems as well. For instance, trademark fair use provisions, such as the EC
defence of ‘due cause’, can ensure that a Mickey Mouse parody complying with copyright 
standards can also be declared permissible in the overlapping field of trademark protection. A 
  
135 For a description of this trend and an overview of current problems, see Derclaye/Leistner, supra note 8; 
Cruquenaire/Dussollier, supra note 8; A. Kur, Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten: Ursachen und Konsequenzen 
der inhaltlichen Annäherung und Überlappung von Schutzrechtstypen, in: G. Schricker/Th. Dreier/A. Kur (eds.), 
Geistiges Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001, p. 23; P.B. Hugenholtz, Over 
cumulatie gesproken, Bijbald bij de intellectuele eigendom 2000, p. 240
–  31  –
patent fair use defence that supports follow-on innovation can help to ensure that copyright 
limitations allowing the decompilation of computer programs to achieve interoperability are 
not eroded when the program concerned also enjoys patent protection. The growth of 
protection overlaps is thus an additional argument for the introduction of fair use defences, 
and an additional confirmation that fair use has become a horizontal issue in IP law. 
To safeguard the inner consistency of the IP system, fair use defences in different protection 
regimes must correspond to each other. They should function as a network allowing
consistent decisions on forms of unauthorized use that are exempted in one protection system 
when it comes to overlaps with other systems. Common ground for such a fair use network
became visible during the present analysis: all fair use defences in IP law should serve the 
overarching objective of fostering the use of pre-existing intellectual resources for the purpose 
of creating new material. This objective is central to cyclic innovation systems, such as 
copyright and patent law. Not surprisingly, the discussion on more flexible limitations in these 
systems focuses on transformative use and experimental use. Market transparency systems, 
such as trademark law, do not seek to encourage the reuse of existing material. Nonetheless, 
the transformative/experimental use rationale is equally applicable. Fair use ensures that the 
stable distribution of intellectual resources in these systems, like the indefinite protection of a 
trademark for one individual trader, does not frustrate cyclic innovation that is central to other 
systems. In case of a short melody enjoying cumulative copyright and trademark protection, a
trademark fair use defence could be applied, for instance, to exempt use of the melody for 
cultural purposes after the expiry of copyright protection.136
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Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram, Den Haag/London/Boston: Kluwer 1998, p. 69. 
